U.S. Dist. Judge Donald L. Graham Disagrees With The United States Supreme Court Yet Again!
Preface
"A district judge may not respectfully (or disrespectfully) disagree with his learned colleagues on his own court of appeals who have ruled on a controlling legal issue, or with Supreme Court Justices writing for a majority of the Court. Binding authority within this regime cannot be considered and cast aside; it is not merely evidence of what the law is. Rather, case law on point is the law. If a court must decide an issue governed by a prior opinion that constitutes binding authority, the later court is bound to reach the same result, even if it considers the rule unwise or incorrect. Binding authority must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so...A decision of the Supreme Court will control that corner of the law unless and until the Supreme Court itself overrules or modifies it. Judges of the inferior courts may voice their criticisms, but follow it they must." Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001). ""Thumbing your nose at the U.S. Supreme Court is almost unheard of in the judicial system," said Kary Moss, ACLU of Michigan Executive Director." U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham made a command decision on his own motion to restrict Marcellus M. Mason's right of access to the courts without giving him due process of law or notice and opportunity to respond prior to the issuance of a pre-filing injunction on September 20, 2001. This denial represents an apparent snub and disdain for the United States Supreme Court and the Congress. Even more outrageous, is that the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, has given its stamp of approval to Judge Graham's disdain and contempt for the United States Supreme Court as the Eleventh Circuit, U.S Court of Appeal has refused to review this pre-filing injunction for validity. See Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sets Guiness World Record For Refusing to Review Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction. The Eleventh Circuit has made the value judgment that Judge Graham's career and reputation is more important than the life of a nobody like Marcellus M. Mason Jr. If Judge Graham and his enablers won't respect the law and the United States Supreme Court then who should?POINT OF THIS POST
This page will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that U.S. District Judge Donald L. Graham, "Teflon Don", has displayed a willful contempt or otherwise thumbing his nose at decisions of the United States Supreme Court, "SCOTUS". Judge Graham has freely admitted that he is legally bound to follow the decisions of both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, U.S . Court of Appeal. See Skylark v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10554 (S.D. FLA 2002) ("In the case of the Southern District of Florida, the only courts it must be obedient to are [the Eleventh Circuit] and the Supreme Court of the United States."). Specifically, this post will address the single issue that Judge Graham eschewed well established law and the Supreme Court's edict that a well grounded lawsuit may not be enjoined even if it could be proven that a Plaintiff had a retaliatory motive in bringing the lawsuit. Other jurisdictions have similarly found that it is no defense to a valid cause of action that the motive or ulterior purpose of the plaintiff in bringing the suit is based on animosity or malice. Additionally, this post will demonstrate that Judge Graham has ignored binding precedent with impunity. In fact, what you will find is that the Eleventh Circuit has used unpublished opinions to contort the law and the facts to keep from rebuking Teflon Don. A perfect example of this tactic is set forth in a blog post entitled "Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664: The Appeal From Hell". This appeal from hell is not consistent with the American Bar Association Statement that:
There are checks on the judiciary and channels to correct improper decisions. The appeal process affords litigants the opportunity to challenge a judicial ruling.
See About Us - ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence.
While not the subject of this post, this sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction is plagued with legal problems, including the following: This motion, as the first motion cited no legal authority for the requested relief. These requests or motions for preliminary injunctions were granted on June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000, respectively. These orders required Mason, a nonlawyer, living in Sebring, FL to contact private attorneys some 90 miles away in Tampa, FL to ask for permission to speak with his local government in Sebring, Florida. These orders in pertinent part stated: “Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.” (DE #201). This order is dated June 19, 2000, “Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' counsel including any requests for public records.” (DE #246). “Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case.” ("clearly erroneous nor is it contrary to law." See Docket Entry No. 407. However, Congress and the law disagree as the law expressly states that: "Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary— a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief...," 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Judge Graham has NEVER at any time cited legal authorities for these patently illegal orders even though there have been relentless requests. See for example, and note that this list is not collectively exhausted, Case No. 99-14027 see Plaintiff’s motions and responses, (Doc.#200);(Doc. #239); (Doc. #262);(Doc. #264);(Doc. #284);(Doc.#334);(Doc. #509);(Doc. #515);(Doc. #526);(Doc. 554);(Doc. 632, pg.5);(Doc.#633);(Doc. 652);(Doc. 663); (Doc. 735); (Doc. 736); (Doc.738); (Doc. 783); (Doc. 787, pgs 2-3); (Doc. 810); (Doc. 812); (Doc.813); (Doc. 817); (Doc. 829), (Doc. 845);and the court's orders: (DE #201), (DE #246);(Doc. #279);(Doc. 281);(Doc. #407);(Doc. #524);(Doc. #528);(Doc. #634);(Doc. 673);(Doc. 744);(Doc. 745);(Doc. 766);(Doc. 791);(Doc. 874, pg. 2);(Doc. 882, pgs. 1-2); (DE-890); (DE-928);(DE-931). On March 2, 2001, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners attorneys, Allen, Norton & Blue, filed a "DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS IN THE FORM OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW". See Docket Entry No. 511. This motion sought dismissal of the lawsuit due to alleged out of court communications with the Highlands County Government in violation the injunctions mentioned above, DE #201) and (DE #246). On April 9, 2001, the Defendants' filed a second motion for sanctions in the form of dismissal of Plaintiff's lawsuit for more alleged out of court communications between Mason and the Highlands County Government. See Docket Entry No. 646. On May 31, 2001, the Magistrate, Frank Lynch, Jr., prepared a Report and Recommendation, "R&R", (D.E. #766), recommended that the lawsuit be dismissed because of these out of court communications between Mason and his local government, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners. Judge Graham accepted this R&R in whole with no changes or comments. See (D.E. #791). Additionally, in his Report and Recommendation that recommends that the lawsuit be dismissed because of alleged violations of the orders of June 19, 2000, (D.E. #201) and July 25, 2000, (D.E. #246), the Magistrate admits that the validity of these orders were being challenged, but he declines to assert legal authority for these orders by stating only: See Report and Recommendation, (D.E. #766, pg. 3, ¶5). This case was closed on June 20, 2001. Motive
It is well-settled law that if a litigant has a valid claim, then the litigant can not as a matter law be guilty of bringing his action(s) in bad faith. Contrary to Judge Graham's personal opinion, the United States Supreme Court has expressly stated that a well founded lawsuit may not be enjoined even if the Plaintiff has a bad motive or a retaliatory motive in bringing the suit. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983)("The filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for the plaintiff's desire to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights protected by the Act."). See also CHI. R.I. & PAC. RY. v. Dowell, 229 U.S. 102, 114 (1913) (“If the plaintiff had a cause of action which was joint and had elected to sue both tort-feasors in one action, his motive in doing so is of no importance.”); Chi., Rock Island RY. v. Whiteaker, 239 U.S. 421, 424-5 (1915) (“ the motive of plaintiff, taken by itself, does not affect the right to remove" and that "if there is a joint liability he has an absolute right to enforce it, whatever the reason that makes him wish to assert the right.“); Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company v. Schwyhart("Again, the motive of the plaintiff, taken by itself, does not affect the right to remove. If there is a joint liability, he has an absolute right to enforce it, whatever the reason that makes him wish to assert the right."); Glorsky v. Wexler, 142 N.J. Eq. 55, 57 (1948) (“[a]n improper motive cannot defeat the enforcement of a lawful right “); Nika v. Danz, 199 Ill.App.3d 296(1990) (“Plaintiff is correct that a party's bad motives in commencing an action are not a valid defense to the action and are immaterial “); Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 622-3(1914) (“[U]sually the court will not inquire into the motives of a party in doing an act such as making an assignment or changing his domicil, the court will not hold that one is not a citizen of a State when, in fact, he is a citizen, solely because his purpose in becoming such a citizen was to enable him to bring a suit.”). Hostility between parties or their counsel ought not to invalidate a lawsuit brought to obtain proper legal relief for potentially meritorious claims.” Colombritov. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1985). " Courts will generally not inquire into the motives which actuate the plaintiff in bringing his action, if he has a legal right which he seeks to protect. It is no defense to a valid cause of action that the motive or ulterior purpose of the plaintiff in bringing the suit is based on animosity or malice. Where the plaintiff shows aright to the relief sought, it is immaterial that he is seeking it for purposes other than the ascertainment and enforcement of the rights which here lies." 1 Fla.Jur. 2d, Actions, Section 29, Page 289. The Act that Defies The United States Supreme Court
On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham rendered a pre-fling injunction sua sponte, or on his motion and without notice to the litigant Marcellus M. Mason. See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878) . Page 3, of this document boldly asserts: THIS CAUSE came before the Court sua sponte.
EVEN MORE INCREDIBLE IS THE FACT THAT THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT REFUSES TO REVIEW THIS SUA SPONTE ISSUED PRE-FILING INJUNCTION FOR VALIDITY. See "Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sets Guiness World Record For Refusing to Review Sua Sponte Issued Pre-Filing Injunction". This type of injunction is commonly referred to under several different names: "leave to file injunction", "vexatious litigant injunction", "pre-filing injunction", "filing injunction", "1651 injunction". This sua sponte issued pre-filing uses the following unauthenticated email to speculate about Mason's motive:
Bad Faith
It has become clear to the Court that Mason is proceeding in bad faith. Indeed, he has admitted as much in his own pleadings and correspondence. Mason has written:
I treated your lawsuit with the contempt and disrespect it deserved . . now you are about to be punished for filing this frivolous action. . . Later, chumps.
(Case No. 01-14240 Defendants' Response to Mason's Motion to Amend, Exhibit 1.)
[Deposition of a witness will be] a fishing expedition [where Mason will seek information] relevant or not"
"[A]re you people learning something from the multiplicity of pleadings you are receiving from me."
(Case No. 00-14240 Complaint, Exhibit 1, Compilation of e-mail transmissions).
These statements are just examples of the numerous comments made by Mason, both to Defendants and to the Court of his intent to needlessly protract litigation and harass the Defendants. Such activity is in bad faith and will not be permitted by the Court.
See Sua Sponte Issued Pre-filing Injunction, (D.E. #878, pgs. 5,6).
Provisions of this sua sponte issued include, but are not limited to, the following:Plaintiff Marcellus M. Mason is Permanently enjoined from filing any additional pleadings in case numbers 99-14027- CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14116-CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14201-CIV-GRAHAM, 00-I4202- CIV-GRAHAM, 00-14240-CIV-GRAHAM, 01-14074-CIV-GRAHAM, 01-14078- CIV-GRAHAM, and 01-14230-CIV-GRAHAM or from filing any new lawsuit which relates in any way to Plaintiff Marcellus M. Mason's former employment and/or subsequent interactions with Defendants without first receiving permission from the Court, as set forth below. This injunction shall apply equally to any persons or entities acting at the behest, direction, or instigation, or in concert with Marcellus M. Mason.
Any request for permission to file a new lawsuit relating to the issues in the above captioned cases and/or Mason's former employment and/or subsequent interactions with Defendants SHALL be in the form of an application filed with the Clerk of Court and addressed to United States District Judge Donald L. Graham. This application shall consist of a one paragraph explanation of the issues in the proposed lawsuit, shall contain the names of all proposed parties and shall not exceed one page. The application shall not include any proposed pleadings.
Any request for permission to file additional pleadings in the above captioned cases already before the Court SHALL be in the form of an application filed with the Clerk of Court and addressed to United States District Judge Donald L. Graham. This application shall consist of a one paragraph explanation of the requested relief in the proposed pleading, and shall not exceed one page. The application shall not include the proposed pleading.
See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878, pgs. 8,9).The Lawsuit Was No Frivolous
On June 20, 2001, Judge Graham expressly found that this lawsuit was not frivolous and had merit. "However, there remain, as this Court recommended, various viable claims for trial." See Report and Recommendation, (D.E #766, pg. 5), and Order Adopting R&R, (D.E. 791). Judge Graham and his Magistrate had previously ruled that such an injunction was improper. Highlands County specifically asked for the type injunction that Judge Graham concocted on September 20.2001 in a lawsuit that it filed in Case No. 00-14240. However, on January 16, 2001 and February 13, 2001, Judge Graham and Judge Graham's own Magistrate stated: “While there are other pending cases between these parties, there is nothing near the extent of the litigation which this Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals usually look to for justifying injunctive relief.” See Case No. 00-14240 (DE 27, pg. 3)(DE 33), URL: Report and Recommendation,"R&R", (D.E. #27), Order Adopting Report and Recommendation,"R&R". In the period between February 13, 2001 and September 20, 2001, Mason did not file any lawsuit in the S.D. FL.No History of Sanctions For Filing Frivolous Motions
In a very litigious case with filings approaching a thousand docket entries, Judge Graham fails identify a single instance where he sanctioned Mason or threatened to sanction Mason for filing frivolous pleadings. See Complete Docket, Case No. 99-14027-Civ-Graham/Lynch. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides that a district court may sanction attorneys or parties who submit pleadings for an improper purpose or that contain frivolous arguments or arguments that have no evidentiary support. See Lectlaw, Legal Definition of Sanctions, Rule 11. Judge Graham was certainly aware of the fact that he could have imposed sanctions under Rule 11 for filing a frivolous pleadings because in Attwood v. Singletary, Case No. 95-5294, 105 F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 1995)he dismissed the case and imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)because the Plaintiff falsely stated his financial status in his in forma pauperis affidavit. In this matter, Judge Graham had from February 1999 to June 20, 2001 when the case was closed and 791 filings, yet Judge Graham did not find one single motion filed by Mason to be worthy of Rule 11 sanctions. All of sudden on September 20, 2001, or three months after case was closed, Judge Graham concocts a pre-filing injunction, sua sponte.Pattern And Practice
Judge Graham has a pattern and practice of ignoring binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent anytime he disagrees with it. A serious allegation such as this should be supported by facts. Since this a fact oriented website, please see the following posts for support of the allegation that Judge Graham ignores binding precedent by the Supreme Court anytime he sees fit:LEGAL ERROR AND JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
Circuit Judge J.L. Edmondson, Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeal, has statutory responsibility under 28 U.S.C. §351 et.seq., to "handle" complaints of judicial misconduct. Judge Edmondson is of the apparent belief that a federal judge can make bad faith legal errors and escape discipline because the complaint is "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling". See for example, Complaint No. 05-0008. It has been said that judicial independence encompasses making mistakes and committing error, but does not afford protection to judges who repeatedly ignore the law." Arizona Supreme Court, Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee, ADVISORY OPINION 92-10,(September 1, 1992). “Legal error and judicial misconduct are not mutually exclusive.” In Re Feinberg, 5 NY3d 206,New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct. "A single instance of serious, egregious legal error, particularly one involving the denial to individuals of their basic or fundamental rights, may amount to judicial misconduct." In re Quirk, 705 So.2d 172 (La., 1997). "[J]udicial misconduct (including improper ex parte communications) varies in degree from plainly criminal or corrupt misconduct, through injudicious (but not corrupt) misconduct, to misconduct committed for proper motives though pursued by prohibited means." Larsen, Matter of, 616 A.2d 529, 532 Pa. 326 (Pa., 1992). An emerging pattern of legal errors even though not an egregious legal error nor bad faith should be labeled misconduct because the continuing pattern of legal error constitutes neglect and ignorance of governing statutes. Miss. Com'n On Jud. Performance v. Britton, 936 So.2d 898 (Miss., 2006). See also In Re James Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525 (Tex.Rev.Trib., 1998)("legal error by a judge may constitute grounds for a finding of judicial misconduct if the commission of legal error is founded on bad faith.");Goldman v. Nevada Com'n on Judicial Discipline, 830 P.2d 107, 108 Nev. 251 (Nev., 1992)("An experienced trial judge's ignorance of proper contempt procedures, without more, has been held to constitute the bad faith necessary to a finding of willful misconduct." )BACKGROUND
Marcellus M. Mason, Jr. of Sebring, Fl. filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against the Highlands County Board of County Commissioners and the Heartland Library Cooperative and other governmental entities and their individual government employees in February 1999. See Docket Sheet. This case was originally assigned to Judge Edward Davis, retired, and ultimately assigned to Judge Donald L. Graham, "Teflon Don", and Magistrate Frank Lynch Jr., Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham/Lynch. After protracted litigation, the case was dismissed, not on the merits of the case, but based upon banned and irrelevant out of court and constitutionally protected and legal communications between Highlands County and Mason. See "R&R" (D.E. 766), Order adopting R&R (D.E 791). See Banned Communications. On June 13, 2000 , the Government Defendants through their attorneys, Maria Sorolis and Brian Koji, filed a "DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, (D.E. 199)" which specifically requested: "Defendants move the Court for an injunction prohibiting Plaintiff from contacting any of the Defendants and/or their supervisory employees...". Defendant's counsel, Maria Sorolis and Brian Koji, cited no legal authority for the requested relief. On July 6, 2000, the Government Defendants through their attorneys, Maria Sorolis and Brian Koji, filed a "DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, (D.E. #231)", and requested the following relief: Defendants respectfully renew their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction prohibiting the Plaintiff from contacting the supervisory employees of the Defendants or the individual Defendants directly, and directing Plaintiff to make all public records requests through the undersigned counsel.
The Plaintiff alludes to this Court's rulings, issued June 19 and July 25, 2000, directing that he should not contact any of the Defendants or individual Defendants, including their supervisory employees, regarding any matter related to this case except through their counsel of rec6rd. If the Plaintiff was represented, his attorney would know that this is proper procedure. The Plaintiff questions this Court's authority to enter an "injunction" as he calls it preventing him from contacting the parties directly. This Court has entered numerous orders on this issue in ruling on Plaintiff's many requests for clarification ito vacate, etc., of this issue and has attempted to clearly point out to the Plaintiff that it is a discovery issue and not one appropriate for injunctive relief. The Plaintiff has appealed those orders to the District Court and they have been affirmed by Judge Graham.
