Beyond the Scope of Appeal: A
Despicable and Egregious Act of Dishonesty

Dist. Ct. Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham
Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664-A, Decided Oct. 16, 2002
Before: Judges Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Judge Stanley Marcus, and Judge Susan H. Black

Extracted from: mmason.freeshell.org/methods.htm

In what can only be described as an act of blatant dishonesty and treachery, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit struck Marcellus Mason's brief for arguing against an invalid sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction because they claimed it was beyond the scope of appeal. However, the Eleventh Circuit then turned around and used the very same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction to affirm Judge Graham when it decided the appeal. What is even more incredible, the Eleventh Circuit accomplishes the impossible by justifying the dismissal of a case closed on June 20, 2001 with a sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction rendered on September 20, 2001. Additionally, the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction has been declared invalid by more courts than you can shake a stick at. See mmason.freeshell.org/SuaSponte.htm. It is clear that the Eleventh Circuit will destroy its own integrity and legitimacy in order to conceal the misconduct and abuse by Judge Donald L. Graham. Do you want proof of these serious allegations? Consider the following and read the provided links to documents.

In Dist. Ct. Case No. 99-14027-CV-Graham, a Notice of Appeal was filed on
June 25, 2001. (Docket Entry 795).

On September 20, 2001, Judge Graham issues a pre-filing injunction, sua sponte. See Docket Entry Number 878, (D.E. # 878).

On March 6, 2002, Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664, the Eleventh Circuit struck Mason’s brief for arguing against the September 20, 2001 sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit ordered Mason to file all new initial briefs less any mention of the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001. The Eleventh Circuit claimed the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction was “beyond the scope of appeal”. See
Order Striking Appellant's Brief.

On March 25, 2002,19 days after the Eleventh Circuit, struck Mason’s brief for arguing against the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, Highlands County argued for the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction in their Answer Brief on pages 18 and 19. However, the Eleventh Circuit, while granting Mason’s motion to strike Highlands County brief for arguing for the same sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction, did not make Highlands County file

all new answer briefs as they had done Mason. The Eleventh Circuit claimed
that it would not consider the sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction
in its decision. See Order Striking Appellees' Brief , which states:

("Appellant's motion to strike Appellees' brief is GRANTED IN PART to the extent that Appellees cite to the District Court's September 2001, Omnibus Order, as that order is outside the scope of this appeal. This Court will disregard any references in Appellees' brief to matters outside the scope of this appeal.").

As stated above,in its opinion of October 16, 2002,
Case No. 01-13664, pgs. 13-14, the Eleventh Circuit stated:

Moreover, despite the closure of the case by the district court, Mason's continual filing of motions with the court addressing matters previously settled prompted the district court to prohibit Mason from further filings without explicit permission and initiate criminal contempt proceedings. Therefore, the record supports the district court's implicit finding that a sanction less than dismissal of the action with prejudice would have had no effect.

It is outrageous that the Eleventh Circuit would uses the same sua sponte
pre-filing injunction of September 20, 2001 that it struck Mason's brief for
arguing in order to make a finding to support a Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.
dismissal. See "Implicit
finding Beyond the Scope.", pgs. 13, 14, Opinion.

Mockery and Meaningless Appeal

Eleventh Circuit, US Court of Appeal
Case No. 01-13664, Oct. 16, 2002, Direct Appeal
Case No. 01-15754, Dec. 5, 2001, Mandamus
Before: Judges Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Judge Stanley Marcus, and Judge Susan H. Black

Extracted from: mmason.freeshell.org/methods.htm
.
If appeal briefs are filed and the appellant calls the district judge, Donald L. Graham, a liar; one would think that such an allegation would be vehemently denied if false, and remedied if true. See Direct Appeal Briefs, Mandamus Petition. However, one would be dead wrong. Judge Graham is excoriated for judicial misconduct and abuse; however, rather than confront these allegations, the Eleventh Circuit simply ignores them. Marcellus Mason filed appeal briefs asserting that Judge Graham should have recused or disqualified due to the following:

• Lying and intentionally misrepresenting law.


• Refusing to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction that had been pending for more than 17 months.


• Allowing scores of motions and filings to languish without being decided.
  


• Usurping legal authority. Allowing a Magistrate to issue an injunction prohibiting direct communication with the Highlands County Government.
  Additionally, prohibiting Marcellus Mason from making public
  records request under Florida Law directly to Highlands County.
  


• Violating clearly established law and the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court by issuing pre-filing injunctions.


• Abuse of the criminal contempt procedure. Judge Graham took a clearly invalid sua sponte issued pre-filing injunction and made it the basis of a
  criminal contempt complaint and conviction.


• Lying and intentionally misrepresenting material facts.


• Ignoring the U.S. Supreme Court denying access to the courts by refusing to state any reason for denying IFP applications.
  

In the direct appeal, the Eleventh Circuit's "review" [a 14 page opinion] of these issues and allegations consisted of solely the following:

Mason also raises issues that relate to non-sanction matters, e.g., the denial of his motions to disqualify the district court and magistrate judges,

See the Unpublished Opinion, Case No. 01-13664-A. There is no suggestion that the above allegations are not true, they are simply ignored because they can not be denied.

The order denying Mandamus, Case No. 01-15754, a one page and one sentence "opinion", is even worse. "The "petition for writ of mandamus and petition for writ of prohibition" is DENIED" .

These are but two instances where the Eleventh Circuit has ignored allegations of misconduct against Judge Graham. There is a whole history of dishonesty set forth at mmason.freeshell.org/methods.htm . This page documents that the futility of attempting to hold a federal judge accountable for misconduct and abuse.

The Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States and the Eleventh Circuit
in particular have developed the perfect mechanism for disposing of
complaints of judicial misconduct and avoiding public scrutiny.
Complaints of judicial misconduct can come in principally three forms:

• Judicial Misconduct Disability Act Complaint, 28 U.S.C.
  §§351


• Petition for Mandamus


• Direct Appeal

Nonpublished or Secret Opinions

The first hurdle to public scrutiny is that the results of the above are beyond public scrutiny because the results are not published and released. The Courts give themselves permission not to publish opinions with respect to mandamus and direct appeals. Judicial Misconduct Act Complaints are confidential by law. The public can not scrutinize what it does not knows exists.

Isolation

A litigant can initiate complaints through all three methods. The Eleventh Circuit will claim that the methods are mutually exclusive. This is a perfect strategy. Having made this claim of mutual exclusiveness, the Eleventh
Circuit is now free to dispose of valid complaints on this procedural
ground. There is no law that says the methods are mutually exclusive.

Valid complaints in the form of mandamus and the Judicial Misconduct Act
will be summarily dismissed on the "plausible" ground that they are properly
handled under the direct appeal. These summary dismissals, when viewed
in isolation can appear to be plausible.

Herding

Herding or Shepherding for the purpose of this website means guiding a
complaint of judicial misconduct towards a particular method. The
Eleventh Circuit guides the other forms of judicial complaints towards the
direct appeal method. Having guided the other forms of judicial
misconduct towards direct appeal, the Eleventh Circuit is now free to ignore
the complaint of judicial misconduct altogether by rendering unpublished opinion or by basing this opinion upon facts that are directly contradicted by the record. The reader must bear in mind that the only thing he or she knows is what the opinion says even if you could get your hands on the unpublished opinion.

This Blog is only a sample of the whole story, please see mmason.freeshell.org/methods.htm It is impossible to overstate the level of dishonesty and lawlessness on the part of Judge Donald L. Graham and his enablers. What you will find is a cesspool of injustice in that Federal Judges use unpublished opinions to ignore facts, manufacture facts, lie, and all manner of other dishonest measures to achieve the desired outcome. mmason.freeshell.org/methods.htm fully documents each and every assertion put forth here.

Judge Donald L. Graham is a Liar!

mmason.freeshell.org/liar.htm

If one assumes that the the personal integrity of Federal Judges is
important and essential to the rule of law, then one of the most pernicious
acts committed by Judge Graham and his enablers is outright lying. Firstly,
Judge Donald L. Graham lies by intentionally misrepresenting the law.
Secondly, Judge Graham's enablers at the Eleventh Circuit, U.S. Court
of Appeal, Judge Ed Carnes and Judge Frank Hull, realizing this lying is a problem, then lie to cover Judge Graham's lie, a truly remarkable story. Judge Graham told Marcellus Mason that he could not state a claim against a state actor, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners for violations 42 U.S.C. §1981. At the very moment Judge Graham told Mason
he could not state a claim against a state actor, Highlands County
Board of County Commissioners for violations 42 U.S.C. §1981, he was
allowing another Plaintiff in another case, Case No. 00-14094-CV-Graham, to
state a claim against the very same state actor, Highlands County
Board of County Commissioners for violations 42 U.S.C.
§1981. The Eleventh Circuit, Judge Ed Carnes and Judge Frank Hull,
then tried to cover for this lie by asserting that Marcellus Mason had not
sought claims under 42 U.S.C. §1981. It is difficult to imagine that anybody, much less a Federal Judge, would tell a lie that is easily proven with documents. For a complete discussion
and documentation of both lies, see mmason.freeshell.org/liar.htm

Judge Donald L. Graham's Magistrate,

Frank Lynch Jr., Issues First Prior Restraint

on Pure Speech

In Over Two Hundred Years.

This blog is part of series that seeks to gain public scrutiny and a little sunshine into the "Culture of Corruption" that exists within the Federal Judiciary. See mmason.freeshell.org/methods.htm which will demonstrate that Federal Judges are accountable to no one and to see how dishonest Federal Judges can be. In reality there is no such thing as discipline of a Federal Judge!! If you ask the fox to guard the chickenhouse, then you should not be surprised when the fox eats the chicken.

In February of 1999, Marcellus Mason filed a suit against the Highlands County Board of County Commissioners and other governmental officials in the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No, 99-14027-CV-Graham.

On June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000, the Magistrate Judge, Frank Lynch Jr., issued the following directives or "discovery orders":

Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case. (DE #201).

Plaintiff shall correspond only with Defendants' counsel including any requests for public records. (DE #246). Plaintiff shall be prohibited from contacting any of the Defendants, including their supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants, regarding any matter related to this case. (DE #246).

“Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary-(A) a judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court except a motion for injunction relief,…” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A).

Judge Graham has held that the above are orders are not "clearly erroneous nor is it contrary to law." Specifically Judge Donald L. Graham held:

On June 19, 2000, the Honorable Magistrate Judge Frank J. Lynch entered an Order granting Defendants a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Plaintiff from contacting any of the Defendants in this action. Upon notice that Plaintiff was violating this order, Defendants filed a Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On July 25, 2000, Magistrate Judge Lynch entered an Order granting Defendants' Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction, once again prohibiting Plaintiff from contacting any of the Defendants in this action or their supervisory employees. Magistrate Judge Lynch also ordered that Plaintiff shall only correspond with Defendants' counsel.

Plaintiff then moved to rescind the July 25, 2000 order, however, on August 15, 2000, Magistrate Judge Lynch denied Plaintiff's Motion to Rescind. Plaintiff appeals the August 15, 2000 ruling. After careful review of the file and the pertinent portions of the record, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Lynch's ruling is not clearly erroneous nor is it contrary to law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see also Cooper-Houston v. Southern Railway Company, 37 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1994).

See Docket Entry No. 407 dated November 2, 2000.



Judge Graham has stated: "including continual attempts to directly communicate with the Defendants rather their attorneys, the Court enjoined Mason from any further contact with the Defendants or Defendants' employees. Mason, however, ignored the Court's order and continued to contact the Defendants." Docket No. 878.

Eleventh Circuit, US Court of Appeal
The Eleventh Circuit, Circuit Court Judge Ed Carnes, has apparently taken the view that a Magistrate may issue an injunction and a prior restraint so long as the Magistrate does not call it an injunction or a prior restraint, but calls these orders "discovery orders". In denying an in forma pauperis petition for mandamus on April 6, 2001, to vacate these orders, the Eleventh Circuit stated:

With regard to his requests for relief from the order granting the defendants' motions for preliminary injunction, which the court construed as a preliminary discovery motion, Mason has an alternative remedy. He may either comply with the district court's discovery order and challenge it on appeal from the final judgment, or refuse to comply with the order and challenge its validity if cited for contempt . See Rouse Constr. Int'l, Inc. v. Rouse Constr. or ., 680 F.2d 743, 745 (11th Cir . 1982).

See Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-11305, Order Denying Mandamus. However, on direct appeal, Case No. 01-13364-A, the Eleventh Circuit, Judges Stanley F. Birch, Jr., Ed Carnes, and Stanley Marcus apparently have upheld the first prior restraint on pure speech in over 200 years by simply ignoring the issue altogether. See
Case No. 01-13364, Direct Appeal Opinion dated October 16, 2002.

Direct Appeal Eleventh Circuit Case No. 01-13664

In this appeal the Eleventh Circuit takes the absurd position, that it can not review the validity of the injunctions because they are "discovery orders". See "discovery orders", above. As fully, set forth above, Judge Graham called these orders injunctions and the Defendant asked for and got the very injunctions granted they sought. In this appeal Mason attacked the validity of these orders because of the following reasons:

• Docket entries 201 and 246 or "discovery orders" are really injunctions and a federal Magistrate may not issue an injunction.
• These Orders violate the First Amendment, Tenth Amendment, and the Florida Constitution.

In this appeal, the Eleventh Circuit boldly admits to the following:

On appeal, Mason argues that the magistrate's discovery orders enjoined him without legal authority and violated his First Amendment and Florida state-law rights to petition Florida government officials and to request public records

See Illegal Orders, below. This opinion is 14 pages long and discusses alleged violations of these so-called "discovery orders", Docket entries 201 and 246 , but refuses to discuss the validity of these so-called "discovery orders".

LAW ON PRIOR RESTRAINTS
“[P]ure speech –[is]- speech not connected with any conduct..” In Re Providence, at 820 F.2d 1348. “'Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.'; see also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.'” New York Times Company v. United States United States v. Washington Post Company, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971)(citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963)) . “[T]he principal purpose of the First Amendment's guaranty is to prevent prior restraints.” In Re Providence at 820 F.2d 1348. “Prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional and face strict scrutiny.” Burk v. Augusta-Richmond County, 365 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir., 2004). "In its nearly two centuries of existence, the Supreme Court has never upheld a prior restraint on pure speech. " Providence Journal Co, at 820 F.2d 1348. The presumption of unconstitutionally of prior restraints has been described as “virtually insurmountable” by Supreme Court judges and others. In Re Providence, at 820 F.2d 1348 (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 713). The Supreme Court has refused to uphold a “prior restraint” even when the matter of national security was involved. See New York Times, at 403 U.S. 713, above. In over two centuries, the United States Supreme Court, composed of nine Article 3 judges, has never upheld a prior restraint involving pure speech; however, in this matter, a statutory judge, Magistrate Judge Lynch breezes right through this barrier and issues a prior restraint on pure speech with no problem.

In Test Masters Educational Services, Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 578 (Fed. 5th Cir., 2005), the district court “enjoined Singh from communicating directly with, threatening, or harassing Test Masters Educational Services, Inc., its employees, its staff, or TES's counsel, counsel's employees, or counsel's staff.” The Fifth Circuit, (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993), defined “prior restraints” thusly: Prior restraints are "administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur." Id. at 579. The Fifth Circuit then expressly declared: “The district court's order enjoining Singh from having any future communication with the specified persons was a prior restraint.” Id. The Court went on to find:

To quote selectively from the district court, the court found that the parties had demonstrated an "immaturity" and "mean-spirited[ness]," and that Singh was pursuing "vexatious litigation." However, despite the perhaps need of these parties to never speak again, the court did not detail, and the record does not reflect, any "exceptional circumstances" to justify permanently enjoining Singh from generally communicating with TES, TES's counsel and their staff and employees. The district court's order enjoining Singh from communicating with TES employees, TES's counsel, and its counsel's employees was a prior restraint limiting Singh's first amendment rights, and because the injunction order is not supported by exceptional circumstances, it is an unconstitutional restraint on Singh's free speech rights. *** The cantankerous relationship between these parties is clearly evident from the record in this case. There is enough evidence presented in the record to justify an injunction order prohibiting Singh from threatening or harassing TES, its employees, its staff, TES's counsel, counsel's employees, or counsel's staff. However, the injunction here went beyond enjoining harassing and threatening conduct. The district court's order swept too broadly when it prohibited all communication between Singh and TES employees, staff or TES's counsel, counsel's employees or counsel's staff.

Id. at 579-80.

U.S. Const. amend. I states:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Article 1, Fla. Const., in pertinent part states:

SECTION 4. Freedom of speech and press.—

Every person may speak, write and publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.

SECTION 9. Due process.—

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.

SECTION 24. Access to public records and meetings.--

Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made confidential by this Constitution. This section specifically includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and each agency or department created thereunder; counties, municipalities, and districts; and each constitutional officer, board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution

Fla.Stat., §119.07, in pertinent part states:

(1)(a) Every person who has custody of a public record shall permit the record to be inspected and copied by any person desiring to do so, at any reasonable time, under reasonable conditions, and under supervision by the custodian of the public records.

The weakest link in our system of justice is the judge. The American system of justice is held hostage to the personal integrity of the judges. If the judge lacks personal integrity then justice may never be found. "The integrity of the judge is, in the final analysis, the keystone of the judicial system; for it is integrity which enables a judge to disregard personalities and partisan political influences and enables him or her to base decisions solely on the facts, and the law applicable to those facts. It is, therefore, imperative that a judicial candidate's integrity and character with regard to honesty and truthfulness be above reproach. An individual with the integrity necessary to quality must be one who is able, among other things, to speak the truth without exaggeration, admit responsibility for mistakes and put aside self-aggrandizement. Other elements demonstrating integrity are intellectual honesty, fairness, impartiality, ability to disregard prejudices, obedience to the law and moral courage."
URL:http://court.nol.org/manual/aba.htm, American Bar Association's Guidelines for Reviewing Qualifications of Candidates for State Judicial Office. If a Judge intentionally lies and misrepresents the law, why should the system protect such a Judge?

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I have discovered that there is no effective way to discipline a rogue federal judge. It is my hope that this blog along with my websites, Direct Appeal, Opinion,Case No. 01-13664-A, mmason.freeshell.org, and geocities.com/mcneilmason/, will aid or provoke conscientious minded citizens into action. The action I seek is to get the Congress to enact some much needed judicial reform. I use the misconduct of Judge Donald L. Graham to document just how badly a federal judge can run amuck of the "rule of law" and get away with it. Judge Donald L. Graham has done all the following and gotten away with it:

* Lied and intentionally misrepresenting the law. Donald L. Graham did this by telling me one version of the law and another version of the law to a different Plaintiff. Graham stated in my lawsuit that I could not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against a state actor while at the very same time he allowed a Plaintiff to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the very same state actor. In my lawsuit, Case No. 99-14027-CIV-Graham, Graham's Court stated: "Counts Eight, Nineteen, Twenty-One, Twenty-Three and Twenty-Five deal with §1981 claims. This Court believes that those claims should likewise be dismissed pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891(11th Cir. 2000). In Butts, the Eleventh Circuit held that §1983 constituted the exclusive remedy against state actors for violation of rights contained in §1981. The Plaintiff has a valid §1983 count pending concerning his termination of employment. He has two Title VII claims as well as a disparate treatment claim pending. The Plaintiffs response does not give sufficient reason why he is entitled to plead a §1981 claim in light of the Buffs decision. Therefore, this Court is going to recommend to the District Court that Counts Eight, Nineteen, Twenty-One, Twenty-Three and Twenty-Five be dismissed with prejudice." At the very same time, Graham was saying that I could not state a claim against a state actor under §1981, he was allowing the Plaintiff to state a claim under §1981 against the very same state actor, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners, in Case No. 00-14094-CIV-Graham, Fa Nina St. Germain v. Highlands County Board of County Commissioners. Fa Nina St. Germain's §1981 was disposed of on the facts, not the law and not Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891(11th Cir. 2000), in Case No. 00-14094-CIV-Graham. Clearly, Judge Graham either lied to me or Fa Nina St. Germain as he could not have told the truth to the both of us. See Page 3, Report and Recommendation, (DE #435). Graham signed this Report and Recommendation. See Order (DE #466).
See Secretlaw.com and geocities.com/mcneilmason/.

On May 2004, Judges Carnes and Hull , Case No. 04-11894, were willing to lie or intentionally misstate the facts in order to cover for Judge Graham. Proof?

Mason merely asserts that Judge Graham was not impartial because … (2) would not let Mason file a § 1981 claim, but did let another plaintiff with similar claims do so... Moreover, a review of Mason’s complaint and the other plaintiff’s complaint reveal that their claims are not similar. Mason’s complaint alleges that county entities and employees violated his First Amendment rights, which is actually a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The plaintiff to which Mason compares himself, however, brought racial and national origin discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) and § 1981. Both Title VII and § 1981 can be used to bring race discrimination claims.

See pgs. 2-3, Opinion, Eleventh Circuit Case No. No. 04-11894-B, URL: http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/04-11894/04-11894.pdf. Both Judge Graham and the Eleventh Circuit know that this assertion is false because my complaint specifically alleges racial discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) and § 1981. See (DE #321, pps. 1, 2, 11; 63-64, 65, ¶¶1, 2, 3, 85, 459-462, 465-466, 473-474), URL: http://geocities.com/mcneilmason/secret/99-14027/ConsolidatedAmendedComplaint.doc. It is hard to imagine that judges would outright lie when they know the record clearly contradicts their statements. Aren't Judges required under the law to tell the truth? What is the punishment for judges that intentionally lie and misrepresent the truth.

*Usurped legal authority in violation of the First and Tenth Amendment. Judge Graham issued orders stating that I must request the permission of private for profit attorneys in order to speak to the government or request Public Records under Florida law. Judge Graham actually dismissed a lawsuit because he said I talked to the government without the permission of a private for profit lawfirm. See Court Orders, (Doc. #201), (Doc. 246) . See Secretlaw.com and geocities.com/mcneilmason/.


* Allowing a motion for a preliminary injunction for to languish in court for 574 days and not make a ruling. The motion for preliminary in injunction was initially filed on November 24, 1999. Essentially, Graham gave himself permission not to rule on a motion for injunctive relief. Despite repeated requests, Graham refused to disclose why he wouldn't rule on the motion for a preliminary injunction. As a side matter, when I filed petition for mandamus (Case No. 01-11305) with the Eleventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit simply stated: "His mandamus petition, however, is frivolous because he has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief to compel the district court to rule on his motion for preliminary injunction." See Secretlaw.com and geocities.com/mcneilmason/.

On May 2004, Judges Carnes and Hull , Case No. 04-11894, were willing to lie or intentionally misstate the facts in order to cover for Judge Graham. Proof?

Mason merely asserts that Judge Graham was not impartial because (1) he allowed many of Mason's motions to languish...As to the alleged languishing, a review of the district court docket sheet shows that the court ruled upon his motions in a timely manner .

See pgs. 2, 3 Case No. 04-11894 Opinion.
How is NEVER ruling on scores of motions and filings ruling "upon his motions in a timely manner"? This answer is false, dishonest, absurd, and insulting. Review the docket and see where Graham never ruled on the motions and filings listed above. See PacerReportsDocketEntries99-14027.html.

* Allowing scores of motions to languish in court for up to 8 months and not taking any action. For a complete listing, see web page languishing motions .


* Concealing Information and Falsely Completing a Civil Justice Reform Act Report. When Graham completed his Civil Justice Reform Act Report for March 31, 2001, he shows that he has no motions pending for more than 6 months. This information is false because the motion for a preliminary injunction had been pending for more 492 days or about 16.4 months. CJRA Report.

* Abuse of the Criminal Contempt Procedure. Judge Graham abused the criminal contempt procedure to intimidate me and attempt to force me to drop an embarrassing lawsuit filed against him. See Grahams Lawsuit and Contempt Abuse.

The Eleventh Circuit will not discuss, much less remedy, any of the allegations of misconduct. These allegations have been repeatedly mentioned through various legal mechanisms, however the Eleventh Circuit, while deployed "unpublished and unsigned" "Opinions", refuse to even state the allegations in their "unpublished and unsigned" "Opinions". Want Proof? Consider the following:

01-15754-A Mandamus Petition

petition

Direct Appeal Case No. 01-13664-A

Initial Brief

 

04-11894 Petition For Mandamus

Mandamus Petition

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal are masters of artifice, treachery, trickery, and dishonesty. The Eleventh Circuit employed these techniques as a part of an overt conspiracy to conceal Judge Graham's misconduct and abuse of power. Even though all manner of appeals, mandamus, and Section 372(c) complaints have been filed, you will not even see these allegations in the Eleventh Circuit's secret and unpublished "opinions". See the Trickery web page for a listing of these techniques. The Eleventh Circuit's "creativity"in avoiding discussing these serious allegations is only exceeded by its dishonesty.


The foregoing are but the tip of iceberg. There is more outrageous behavior by both Judge Graham and the Eleventh Circuit. See Secretlaw.com, mmason.freeshell.org, and geocities.com/mcneilmason/ for more information and atrocities.




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Judge Graham Dismisses Lawsuit Because Plaintiff makes Florida Public Records Request

Highlands County through its attorney, Maria Sorolis, asked Judge Graham to dismiss a lawsuit, because the Plaintiff, Marcellus M. Mason, Jr. made a public records request under Florida Law. Here is what the Defendants asked Judge Graham for and got, verbatim.

6) During the week of February 5, 2001, Plaintiff knowingly violated this Court’s Orders of June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000. Plaintiff appeared at the office of Fred Carino, Human Resource Director of Highlands County and a supervisory employee of a named defendant in this action, and demanded to view his personnel file. This request was made directly to Mr. Carino’s office and not through Defendant Highlands County’s counsel.1 Notwithstanding, his file was produced to him. During this visit, Plaintiff pointed out that certain portions of the contents of his personnel file should be removed. (Exhibit 5). These acts were done with apparent intent to challenge this Court’s authority to issue Orders enjoining Plaintiffs conduct.
(7) On February 13, 2001, Plaintiff appeared at Fred Carino’s office and demanded to view attorney billing records from Defendant Highlands County’s counsel relevant to its defense of his litigation. Mr. Mason left before the records could be produced. Id.
‘In an effort to cooperate with Plaintiff, Defendants’ counsel has allowed the production of a document to take place at Mr. Carino’s office. Notwithstanding, Defendants’ counsel has always required Plaintiff to make his request for the particular production only through them.
(8) On February 14, 2001, Plaintiff returned to Fred Carino’s office and demanded to view attorney billing records from Defendant Highlands County’s counsel relevant to its defense of his litigation. This request was made directly to Mr. Carino’s office and not through Defendant Highlands County’s counsel. Notwithstanding, the records were produced to him. Id.
(9) After reviewing the, records, Mr. Mason penned a note to Mr. Carino stating that he wanted unredacted portions of billing records and if he did not get them he will file a lawsuit by February 16, 2001.2 Id
(10) Mr. Mason returned to Mr. Carino’s office a second time on February 14, 2001 and knowingly violated this Court’s Orders of June 19, 200 and July 25, 2000. He demanded to view Defendant Highlands County’s Insurance Document of Coverage, a docuthent that had previously been produced to him. This request was made directly to Mr. Carino’s office and :not through Defendant Highlands County’s counsel. Notwithstanding, the document was produced to him. Id.
(11) During this visit, Plaintiff became loud, aggressive, disruptive, and questioned the need for Mr. Carino’s presence during his review of the document. Plaintiff suggested to Mr. Carino that his time could be better spent responding to Plaintiffs many interrogatories. Id.
(12) During his confrontation, Mr. Mason made threatening gestures to Mr. Carino with his hands that came within six (6) inches of Mr. Carino’s face. Plaintiff threatened Mr. Carino numerous times that Plaintiff would have him arrested if he arrested if he did not turn over whatever documents Plaintiff demanded. Plaintiff also threatened to go directly to the courthouse and file suit against Highlands County and Mr. Carino individually. Plaintiff promised Mr. Carino that he would continue to return to his office to demand public records and documents. Id.
(13) Subsequent to these events, and up to the time of the filing of this motion, Plaintiff has continued to violate this Court’s Order by personally contacting Mr.Carino’s office for discovery matter in a harassing manner without first going through Defendant’s counsel. (Exhibit 7).
(14) Plaintiff has demonstrated a blatant disregard for this Court’s authority and a resolve indicative of bullying his way through this litigation on his own terms. (Exhibit 6).
(15) Plaintiffs conduct in violation of this Court’s Orders of June 19, 2000 and July 25, 2000 require a dismissal with prejudice of all of plaintiff’s claims in the above-referenced matter.

See DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS IN THE FORM OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S ACTION SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW

The first motion was not good enough, so Highlands County asked for another motion not to be communicate with.

(10) Since April 3, 2001 - subsequent to the Court’s March 27th Order - Plaintiff has repeatedly personally contacted supervisory employees and/or the individual Defendants about matters related to this case. Specifically, Plaintiff sent e-mail communications directly to supervisory employees of the Defendants, which discussed the “no trespass warnings” that were issued against Plaintiff, Plaintiffs tortious interference claim, as well as Allen, Norton & Blue’s “track record” of litigating appeals (including Eleventh Circuit appeals). (Exhibit 1).
(11) Clearly, Plaintiffs “no trespass” and tortious interference claims were an integral part of Plaintiffs present litigation, and involve the same set of facts that Plaintiff continues to rely on in pursuing his present claims. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint alleged several causes of action based on the issuance of the “no trespass” warnings against Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff’s “no trespass” claims were ultimately dismissed by the Court (D.E.’s #435; 466), Plaintiff has recently indicated his intent to appeal the Court’s dismissal of all claims in his Fourth Amended Complaint. (Exhibit 2). Consequently, the issuance of the “no trespass” warnings against Plaintiff are still part of this present litigation.
(12) In addition, Plaintiff’s communications regarding Defendants’ counsel’s Eleventh Circuit “track record” clearly have no relevance to his state court claim(s), and pertain only to his federal litigation.
(13) All of Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same set of facts and are all related, and he should simply not be allowed to continuously disregard Orders of this Court and blatantly challenge the Court’s authority.
(14) Plaintiff has continued to violate this Court’s Order by personally contacting these individuals, despite clear warnings by the Court that any future violations will result in the recommendation of dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s claim(s). Plaintiff has demonstrated a blatant disregard and disdain for this Court’s authority, as evidenced by Plaintiff’s statement that “ANYBODY, who supports your position. . . is a racist and is part of the problem. I fear no man!!! This includes white men wearing robes” and “I aint afraid of a white men wearing robes of any color.” (Exhibit 1, e-mails dated 4/03/01 at 10:57 a.m. and 4/06/01 at 8:33 a.m. respectively)
(15) Plaintiff’s continuous violation of this Court’s Orders mandate a dismissal of all of plaintiffs claims in the above-referenced matter with prejudice.

WHEREFORE, Defendants’ request that this Court dismiss with prejudice all of Plaintiffs claims in the above-referenced matter.

See DEFENDANTS’ SECOND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS IN THE FORM OF DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S ACTION SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW


The "Court" or Judge Donald L. Graham granted these patently illegal motions.

See (Doc 766, Report and Recommendtion); (Doc. 791, Order Adopting Report and Recommendtion).